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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently interpreted 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001
[hereinafter "§ 1001"]' in Brogan v. United States.2 Section 1001 criminalizes the
making of materially false statements regarding matters within the jurisdiction of
any branch of the federal government.3 The "exculpatory no" defense, formerly a
defense to prosecution under § 1001, 4 provided that § 1001 did not reach simple
false denials of wrongdoing.5 Brogan, however, invalidated the "exculpatory no"
defense.6 This Casenote analyzes the soundness of that invalidation.7
Part II of this Casenote accomplishes three objectives. First, it briefly examines
the history and purposes of § 1001.8 Second, it examines the parameters and
rationales of the "exculpatory no" defense.9 Third, it discusses the different
analytical approaches to application of the "exculpatory no" defense. 10
Part Im dissects Brogan," proceeding through the analysis of the appellate
court 12 and the Supreme Court.' 3 Part I then attempts to explain the reasons why
both courts decided to abandon the "exculpatory no" defense.'
4
Part IV offers a critical analysis of the soundness of Brogan.5 It makes two
arguments. First, it argues that, in light of the arguments advanced in support of the
"exculpatory no" defense, the Supreme Court correctly decided Brogan, although
its reasoning was, in places, suspect.' 6 Second, it predicts that the death of the
"exculpatory no" defense will not drastically expand § 1001's breadth.
1 7
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West Supp. 1999). This section provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully-(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
Id.
2. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
3. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West Supp. 1999).
4. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401 (outlining the basics of the defense).
5. See id. (explaining the effect of the defense on § 1001).
6. See id. at 408 (eliminating the "exculpatory no" defense).
7. Infra Part IV.
8. Infra Part II.
9. Infra Part l.A.
10. Infra Part l.B.
11. InfraPart Ill.
12. Infra Part II.B.
13. Infra Part 1II.C.
14. Infra Part I.B-C.
15. Infra Part IV.
16. Infra Part W.A.
17. Infra Part IV.B.
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Part V proposes a pair of solutions to some of § 1001's perceived problems.'"
The first solution is to convert some of the dicta of the Second Circuit in United
States v. Wiener 9 into controlling law.20 This solution is available to the Judicial
Branch and the U.S. Congress.2' The second solution is to reduce the grade of §
1001 violations to the misdemeanor level.22 This second solution would necessarily
require congressional action. 3
On a general level, the purpose of this Casenote is to raise awareness of the
problems inherent in the combination of the breadth of § 1001 and the severity of
the penalties applicable to its violators. The reader should consider the basic idea
espoused throughout this Casenote-that the present scope of § 1001 makes it a
statute that opens the door to excessive punishment of non-violent, non-serious
offenses. Indeed, statistics show that federal prisons already are populated
predominantly by non-violent offenders. 24 In this era, when politicians have
excelled at exploiting a superficial "anti-crime" sentiment, s § 1001 creates more
problems than it solves. Therefore, this Casenote concludes that the severe penalties
available for violators of § 1001 are unnecessary in light of the relatively minor
nature of most § 1001 violations.
I1. SECTION 1001
Section 1001 "prohibits knowingly and willfully making a false statement
which is material to a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of
the United States. 2 6 A person who violates § 1001 faces a fine, imprisonment for
up to five years, or both.27 Congress enacted § 1001's predecessor in 1863 in an
effort to discourage the filing of false claims with the United States government.28
Congress broadened the scope of the statute in 191829 to include false statements
made with the purpose of cheating "the Government out of property or money.
30
18. Infra Part V.
19. 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996).
20. Infra Part V.A.
21. Infra Part V.A.
22. Infra Part V.B.
23. Infra Part V.B.
24. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 17
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (reporting that statistical data available indicate that the population of the federal
prison system is approximately 90% non-violent).
25. Cf id. at 18 (discussing how public officials purport to be tough on crime by constructing more prisons;
however, they fill these prisons with non-violent offenders).
26. Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469,473 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Brogan v. United States, 522
U.S. 398 (1998).
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West Supp. 1999).
28. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 412 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the
history of § 1001).
29. Id.
30. See i (citing United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339,346 (1926)).
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Congressional amendments in 1934 and 1948 broadened the language of the statute
31to its present scope.
The following hypothetical illustrates § 1001's broad scope. Suppose a
vacationer, X, is returning from a trip to Mexico around the Fourth of July. While
in Mexico, X purchased several items, including a small box of fireworks. As X
crosses the border into the United States, a U.S. border patrol agent asks X whether
he purchased anything while out of the country. X replies no. X has willfully made
a false statement on a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch,
namely, preventing the introduction of contraband from abroad into the United
States, because he knew that he had purchased fireworks while out of the country.
X's statement is material because such information would be important to the
agent's detection of contraband from abroad. Hence, X could be prosecuted under
§ 1001 and, if convicted, fined or sentenced to prison for five years, or both.32
A. The "Exculpatory No" Defense
Federal courts created the "exculpatory no" defense to limit § 1001's broad
scope.3 The most significant aspect of the defense was its removal of simple
denials of guilt from the purview of § 1001.34 The defense amounted to a "judicial
expression of the view that the statute is generally not applicable to false statements
which are essentially exculpatory denials of criminal activity."
35
Prior to Brogan,36 lower federal courts had advanced a number of justifications
for the creation and application of the "exculpatory no" defense.37 First, some courts
reasoned that prosecutions for a mere denial of wrongdoing could violate the Fifth
Amendment's guarantees against self-incrimination. These courts premised their
31. Idat413.
32. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1999) (setting the limit on punishment at five years'
imprisonment, fines, or both).
33. See generally Moser, 18 F.3d at 473-74 (analyzing the "exculpatory no" defense); United States v.
Taylor, 907 F.2d 801,805 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir.
1988) (same); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Tabor, 788
F.2d 714, 717-19 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-81 (10th Cir. 1980)
(same); and United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (Ist Cir. 1975) (same). This list is not exhaustive.
34. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401 (pointing out that the central feature of the doctrine was "that a simple
denial of guilt [would] not come within the statute").
35. Moser, 18 F.3d at 473.
36. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
37. See generally Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d at 1227 (adopting the defense to prevent self-incrimination);
Chevoor, 256 F.2d at 183 (accepting the defense because of a lack of safeguards in such contexts as perjury
prosecutions).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1986) (supporting the
proposition that the "exculpatory no" defense is based in part on a reluctance to apply § 1001 in situations that
could involve the Fifth Amendment) (quoting United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974)
(en banc)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (commanding that "[n]o person shall be... compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself").
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wariness on the tension between § 1001 prosecutions for false denials of
wrongdoing and the Fifth Amendment.39 In essence, these courts were concerned
that a person could be forced into the unenviable position of having to incriminate
herself to avoid violating § 1001.40 The "exculpatory no" defense grew out of the
idea that Congress did not design § 1001 to "compel persons suspected of crimes
to assist criminal investigators in establishing their guilt.' '4t
Second, these courts had rooted their support of the "exculpatory no" defense
in what they perceived to be the congressional intent behind § 1001's broad
language42  ie., to provide a means of redress for the federal government against
persons who affirmatively act to defraud the government or its agents.43 Along these
lines, courts had justified the defense on the ground that Congress intended § 1001
to proscribe falsehoods that perverted government functions, not simple false
responses to an investigator's questions.
44
Third, pro-"exculpatory no" courts based the defense on general notions of
fairness.45 By this rationale, subjecting people to § 1001's harsh sanctions for a
simple denial of guilt would be unfair. For example, § 1001 does not require that
a person be under oath before being subject to penalties for violating the statute.
46
An oath tends to impress upon the individual the importance of being truthful.47
Also, the informality that accompanies many § 1001 violations has caused judicial
discomfort with the notion of prosecuting people to the full extent of the statute.48
A person confronted by a federal agent in an informal setting is not likely to be
39. See Moser, 18 F.2d at 474 (acknowledging that "tension between the statute and the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination has been recognized by many courts').
40. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988) (addressing the problem of self-
incrimination).
41. Id. at 185.
42. See Moser, 18 F.2d at 473 (agreeing with the proposition that legislative intent is one basis for the
"exculpatory no" defense) (quoting Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Statements Fall Within Exculpatory Denial
Exception to Prohibition, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001, Against Knowingly and Willfully Making False Statement
Which is Material to Matter Within Jurisdiction of Department orAgency of United States, 102 A.L.R. FED. 742,
748-49 (1991)).
43. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205 (D. Md. 1955) (discerning the legislative intent
behind § 1001).
44. See Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 184 (discussing the relationship between the "exculpatory no" defense and
§ 1001's purpose).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 181 (1st Cir. 1975) (addressing, within the context
of an "exculpatory no" analysis, the propriety of the district court's dismissal, on grounds of fairness, of the
defendant's indictment).
46. See ic at 183 (agreeing that prosecution of an individual under § 1001 for a mere denial of wrongdoing
"would undermine the safeguards that are normally provided in perjury prosecutions, primarily the formality of
the oath, while permitting sanctions as great as those under perjury statutes").
47. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 411 (1998) (Ginsburg, ., concurring) (recognizing the
connection between the oath and a "pause to concentrate the speaker's mind on the importance of his or her
answers").
48. See i&. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing informality and its bearing on § 1001 prosecutions).
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aware of the seriousness and potential feloniousness of making a false denial of
wrongdoing.49
The fourth justification cited by lower federal courts in support of the
"exculpatory no" defense was wariness of the potential for abuse of § 1001.50 This
potential for abuse derives from the extreme breadth of § 1001's language.51 For
example, recall the hypothetical discussed above in which falsely denying the
possession of fireworks at the U.S. border could result in a § 1001 prosecution.52
Without the "exculpatory no" defense, § 1001's broad text would include simple
false denials of guilt uttered in response to government agents' questions.53 Because
the "exculpatory no" defense removed these types of falsehoods from § 1001's
reach, its effect was to decrease the scope of the statute, thus limiting the potential
for abuse.5"
The above-mentioned justifications formed the bulk of the lower courts'
reasoning in creating and applying the "exculpatory no" defense. When the United
States Supreme Court decided Brogan, seven of the United States Courts of
49. See iL (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing concern over the informality of circumstances in which
a person might violate § 1001). Ginsburg noted that prosecutions under § 1001 may be based on statements uttered
in informal circumstances insufficient to impress upon the speaker the potential feloniousness of deliberately
making a false statement. IL at 410-11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Ehrlichman, 379 F.
Supp. 291,292 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
50. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that "the 'exculpatory no'
doctrine is a narrow yet salutory [sic] limitation on a criminal statute which, because of its breadth, is subject to
potential abuse"); see also United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990) (voicing concern that §
1001's language lends itself to abuse, viewing the "exculpatory no" doctrine as a partial blockade to such abuse,
and citing CogdeU with approval).
51. See Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 183 (emphasizing the nexus between the statute's breadth and its potential
for abuse).
52. Supra text accompanying note 32.
53. See id. (crininaizing any willful material false statements within the jurisdiction of a federal
government agency).
54. For example, in United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (1 lth Cir. 1986), an IRS agent learned that Tabor
notarized a deed in violation of Florida law. Id at 718. The agent went to Tabor's home with a deputy sheriff and
engaged her in a series of questions and answers regarding the illegal notarization of the deed. Il at 716. The
agent never warned Tabor of the consequences of being untruthful in answering the questions. Id. at 718. Tabor
denied wrongdoing, and the government prosecuted her under § 1001. d at 716. "An IRS agent thus turned a
violation of state law into a federal felony by eliciting a lie that misled no one" Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S.
398, 410 (1998) (Ginsburg, L, concurring) (discussing Tabor). Relying on the "exculpatory no" defense, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed Taboer's conviction., Tabor, 788 F.2d at 719.
Justice Ginsburg's discussion of Tabor puts the situation involved in that case in perspective. Without the
"exculpatory no" defense, the government would have succeeded in compounding Tabor's violation of Florida
law by creating a violation of federal law. This species of prosecutorial alchemy would have been an abusive use
of § 1001 because Tabor had only violated state law. Thus, the "exculpatory no" defense prevented an abuse of
§ 1001.
1999/Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response
Appeals had adopted some form of the "exculpatory no" defense. 55 Only the Fifth
Circuit had expressly rejected the doctrine.56
B. The "Exculpatory No" Defense in the Federal Courts
As stated above, a number of federal courts used the "exculpatory no" defense
to remove simple false exculpatory statements from the reach of § 1001.57 However,
the precise application of the defense was not always consistent. Three general
approaches to its application emerged from the seven circuits that recognized the
defense. The most common approach involved the analysis of a number of
factors-such as the formality of the circumstances surrounding a falsehood and
whether a falsehood was exculpatory-in light of the facts of a particular case (the
"factors approach"). 58 The second approach-an offshoot of the first-required the
court to treat the "factors" as indispensable elements (the "elements approach"). 59
Under the elements approach, failure to satisfy even one of the elements was fatal
to a successful assertion of the "exculpatory no" defense.6° The third, and probably
the narrowest, approach was also similar to the factors approach, except that it
required the court to focus its analysis on the expansiveness of the falsehood that
formed the basis of a § 1001 prosecution (the "narrow approach"). 6t The cases
below illustrate the utilization of these various analytical approaches and provide
further background information relevant to the discussion of the "exculpatory no"
defense.62
55. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996), affid sub nom. Brogan v. United States,
522 U.S. 398 (1998) (listing the circuits that had adopted the "exculpatory no" defense). The First, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all had adopted the defense. Moser v. United States, 18 F3d
469,473-74 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801,805 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cogdell,
844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988); Tabor,
788 F.2d at717-19; United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874,880-81 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor,
526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975).
56. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting the
"exculpatory no" defense).
57. See Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d at 1224 (applying the defense to false exculpatory responses made to
government investigators).
58. See, e.g., Moser, 18 F.3d at 473-74 (allowing the case to go to the jury on the issue of an "exculpatory
no" because the defendant met some factors, but not others); Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 183 (engaging in a factor-
oriented analysis); Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183-84 (applying factors analysis); see generally Moser, 18 F.3d at 473-
74 (stating the elements of the "exculpatory no" defense).
59. See Taylor, 907 F.2d at 805 (requiring that each element of the test be met in order to raise the defense
successfully); see also Equihua-Juarez, 851 E2d at 1224 (stating that the five factors should be satisfied). The
court in Equihua-Juarez also stated that a defendant raising the "exculpatory no" defense must meet "certain
requirements." Id, (emphasis added).
60. See Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d at 1224 (reserving application of the defense to instances in which all
five elements are met).
61. See United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 717-19 (1lth Cir. 1986) (emphasizing that the falsehood
must be no more than a simple denial).
62. Infra Part II.B.1-3.
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1. The Factors Approach
Moser v. United States63 provides an example of using the factors approach in
an "exculpatory no" analysis. 4 Moser involved a realtor named Valli M. Moser,6
whose ex-husband was the subject of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
investigation regarding his refinancing of some real estate in Wisconsin,6 the
mortgage on which Moser's name appeared. 67 To refinance the property, her ex-
husband had to pay an outstanding tax liability to the IRS.6' In connection with this
outstanding tax liability, Moser had a number of discussions with Brian Best, the
IRS collections manager in Eau Claire, Wisconsin.69 These discussions left Best
with the impression that Moser had tried to bribe him to reduce her ex-husband's
tax liability.
70
In August of 1992, two other IRS agents visited Moser's home in connection
with Moser's possible attempted bribery of Best.71 The interview was formal.2
After being informed of her constitutional rights, Moser executed a written waiver
of her right to remain silent.' The interview lasted forty minutes.7a Moser denied
that she and Best had ever discussed her ex-husband's tax liability.75 She also
denied attempting to bribe Best into reducing her ex-husband's taxes.76
Moser was indicted for bribery and violating § 1001.77 She was acquitted on the
bribery count, but she was convicted on the § 1001 count.78 On appeal, Moser
argued that the trial court erred by not dismissing the § 1001 count of the
indictment because her responses to the agents' questions were within the
"exculpatory no" defense.7 9 Moser contended that the issue of her criminal liability
for a § 1001 violation should not have gone to the jury because her responses met
the "exculpatory no" defense as a matter of law?°
63. 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. Ud. at 473-74.












77. Id. at 470.
78. Id. at 471.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 473.
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The appellate court stated that the "exculpatory no" defense applied to "false
statements which are essentially exculpatory denials of criminal activity."8' It noted
the following fivejudicially created limitations on the defense's application: (1) the
false denial must have been exculpatory; (2) the falsehood must not have been an
"affirmative misrepresentation;" (3) the false denial must have occurred under
circumstances not formal enough to make the declarant aware he or she was under
investigation; (4) the false denial must not have been made in connection with a
claim against the government; and (5) the false denial must have been given in
response to a government-initiated inquiry.82 In analyzing the facts, the court noted
that Moser's denial was within some, but not all, of these limitations."3 On the one
hand, she had not made a claim against the government.' On the other hand,
although she had not initiated the interview, she should have been aware that she
was an investigation target because the interviewing agents had informed her of her
rights.85 After reviewing these facts, the court held that the trial court's decision to
send the "exculpatory no" issue to the jury was not error, and it upheld Moser's §
1001 conviction."
The court's analysis exemplified the factors approach. Although the question
whether Moser's statements had met each of the factors listed by the court was
unclear, the trial court had submitted Moser's "exculpatory no" defense to the
juryY Presumably, the jury could have acquitted Moser if it had decided that her
statements met the "exculpatory no" defense. Had the court applied the elements
approach, discussed infra,8 8 Moser's "exculpatory no" defense would have failed
for want of her ability to establish each element of the defense.
United States v. Chevoor 9 provides another example of the factors approach to
an "exculpatory no" analysis. In Chevoor, government agents investigated a
gambling and loansharking operation. 90 Use of undercover agents and wire taps
revealed evidence suggesting that Chevoor was a victim of the loansharking under
investigation. 91 Apparently, he owed about seven thousand dollars to Pellici, the
target of the gambling and loansharking investigation.92
Armed with this information, agents went to Chevoor's residence.93 They
served a subpoena on Chevoor to appear before a grand jury in the investigation of
81. Id.






88. Infra Part '.B.2.
89. 526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975).
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Pellici.94 The agents told Chevoor he was not a target of the investigation, but they
instructed Chevoor to report to a Strike Force attorney, Friedman, for further
questioning.95 Friedman asked Chevoor questions about whether Pellici had ever
loaned him any money or whether he owed any money to Pellici.96 Chevoor
responded that he neither took loans from Pellici nor owed him any money.9 He
gave simple negative responses.9" An agent present during the questioning then told
Chevoor that he was required to testify before the grand jury and that he could be
prosecuted if he gave false testimony before the grand jury.99 Chevoor's questioners
told him that they knew he was not telling the truth about the loans, but Chevoor
stood by his earlier denials."° Chevoor was asked the same questions before the
grand jury.'0' Again he answered them negatively.'02 He was indicted for
"knowingly making false declarations to a federal grand jury[;]"'0 3 however, he was
not indicted for violating § 1001.' 04
The district court found that the agents placed Chevoor in an unacceptable
dilemma-either he had to testify truthfully before the grand jury about the loans
and become liable for a § 1001 violation, or testify falsely before the grand jury
about the loans and become liable for perjury.'05 According to the district court, this
dilemma violated the Fifth Amendment due process' °6 notions of fundamental
faimess.'07 Therefore, the court dismissed his indictment pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment and the court's own supervisory powers.'3 8 The government appealed
the dismissal.' °9
The appellate court held that the government did not place Chevoor in any sort
of dilemma that involved choosing one of two self-incriminating options." 0











104. United States v. Chevoor, 526 F2d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1975).
105. See id. at 180 (stating that the district court described Chevoor as "being on the horns of a dilemma");
see also id. at 181 (noting that the district court dismissed Chevor's indictment because the government-created
dilemma in which Chevoor found himself violated fundamental fairness).
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (guarding against deprivations of various individual rights "without due
process of law").
107. Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 181.
108. Id.
109. d.
110. See id. at 184 (reasoning that the government did not confront Chevoor with a choice of committing
perjury or violating § 1001).
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responses to the agents prior to his grand jury testimony were within the
"exculpatory no" defense."' Thus, the dilemma of self-incrimination never existed
because Chevoor never faced criminal liability for a § 1001 violation.'
Although the court did not state overtly that it was applying a factors approach,
it did just that. The court's analysis of the "exculpatory no" defense manifested a
totality of the circumstances approach. The analysis was guided by some of the
factors identified by other courts in applying the "exculpatory no" defense, such as
whether the defendant had made an affirmative claim against the government," 3 or
whether the defendant had given an expansive fabrication or a simple denial of
wrongdoing.114 The court noted that Chevoor's falsehoods were neither connected
to a claim against the government, nor related to a claim by the government against
him." 5 Chevoor had not initiated the contact with the government, and his
prevarication consisted of a mere denial of wrongdoing. 16 The denial was oral, and
no transcript of the interview existed." 7 Moreover, the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement were highly informal because he was not under oath.1"
On these facts, the court determined that Chevoor's lies were not even "statements"
for purposes of § 1001.119 Under the totality of these circumstances, the court
decided that Chevoor's lies met the "exculpatory no" defense.1
20
The analysis in both Moser and Chevoor illustrates the factors approach. As
noted above, the factors approach as it was applied in those cases was similar in
several respects to the elements approach, discussed infra-the key difference being
that the elements approach required treatment of the factors as elements
indispensable to a successful "exculpatory no" defense.1
2 '
2. The Elements Approach
United States v. Equihua-Juarez' is an example of a case where a court
applied the elements approach to an "exculpatory no" analysis. United States
Border Patrol agents arrested Equihua-Juarez for illegal entry into the United
111. See id, at 182 (determining that Chevoor's statements were within the "exculpatory no" defense).
112. See id. (explaining why Chevoor was not forced into to self-incrimination).
113. See United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224(9th Cir. 1988) (limiting application of the
"exculpatory no" defense to instances in which the defendant has not made a claim against the government).
114. See United States v. Tabor, 788 F2d 714,718 (11th Cir. 1986) (focusing the analysis on whether the
falsehood entailed anything other than a disclaimer of "involvement in possible criminal activity").




119. Id; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1999) (criminalizing materially false "statements").
120. Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183.
121. See infra Part H.B.2 (discussing one court's utilization of the elements approach in light of an
"exculpatory no" analysis).
122. 851 F2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
States. 123 After reading him his Miranda rights, the agents proceeded to ask
Equihua-Juarez questions about his biographical information.1 24 When they asked
for his name, he replied "Martin Ramirez-Estrada."'' 1 A fingerprint analysis
revealed that Equihua-Juarez had given the agents a false name, and that he had
been convicted of illegally entering the United States in the past.
126
Equihua-Juarez was charged with felony illegal entry and a violation of §
1001.127 He moved to dismiss the § 1001 charges,' arguing that giving a false
name fell within the "exculpatory no" defense. 129 The trial court denied the motion,
and Equihua-Juarez was convicted on all counts. 30 Consequently, he received a
sentence of one year's imprisonment for the § 1001 violation.
3 1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his conviction after determining
that his responses met the "requirements" of the "exculpatory no" defense. 32 In
arriving at that conclusion, the court applied five elements to Equihua-Juarez's false
statement: 1
33
(1) the false statement must be unrelated to a claim to a privilege or a claim
against the government; (2) the declarant must be responding to inquiries
initiated by a federal agency or department; (3) the false statement must not
impair the basic functions entrusted by law to the agency; (4) the
government's inquiries must not constitute a routine exercise of
administrative responsibility; and (5) a truthful answer would have
incriminated the declarant.' 34
According to the court, Equihua-Juarez's statement met each of these elements.
135
The court quickly dispensed with the first two elements. 136 Because Equihua-
Juarez did not lie to the agents in order to get into the United States, the statement
met the first element.137 His statement met the second element because the agents
had initiated the inquiry, and Equihua-Juarez uttered the statement in response to









132. Il at 1227.
133. L at 1224.
134. l at 1224 (citing United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1986)).
135. L at 1227.
136. Ia at 1225.
137. Id
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that inquiry. 3 The court also reasoned that Equihua-Juarez's statement met the
third element; giving a false name did not impair the basic functions of the Border
Patrol Agency because its agents should expect aliens to give false names.
139
Moreover, the court determined that the statement met the fourth element because
the questioning agent was not performing routine administrative duties but instead
was acting "as a police investigator conducting an interrogation.' 140 Finally, the
court determined that Equihua-Juarez's statement met the fifth element because by
giving his true name he would have incriminated himself by alerting the agents to
his prior illegal entries.14 1 A prior conviction for illegal entry is an element of the
crime of felony illegal entry.'42 Thus, disclosing his true identity to the agents
would have furnished them with evidence necessary to convict him of a felony
illegal entry.143 Because Equihua-Juarez's statement was the sine qua non of his §
1001 conviction, and because the statement met all five elements of the
"exculpatory no" defense, the court reversed his § 1001 conviction. 44
3. The Narrow Approach
In United States v. Tabor,'45 the court applied the narrow approach to an
"exculpatory no" analysis.' 46 Mary Nell Tabor was a notary public in Florida. 47
During the course of an IRS criminal investigation of Mr. Forest Weeks, an IRS
agent discovered that Tabor had notarized two signatures on a satisfaction of
mortgage. 48 Florida law at the time required that before a document could be
notarized, the signatory would have to appear before a notary and produce adequate
evidence of identification. 49 The IRS agent discovered that one of the signatories
on the satisfaction of mortgage had died five weeks before the document was
signed. 50 The agent went to Tabor's home and asked her whether the deceased
signatory had appeared before her when he executed the satisfaction of mortgage.'
5 '
138. Id
139. See id (applying the third element of the test).
140. Id
141. l at 1227.
142. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (a) (West 1999) (setting out the elements of the crime of "[i]mproper entry by
alien" into the United States).
143. See Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d at 1227 (indicating that a truthful response would have facilitated
Equihua-Juarez's conviction).
144. Id.
145. 788 F.2d 714 (1lth Cir. 1986).
146. Id at 717-19.
147. Id at 716.
148. ld. at 715.
149. Id at 715-16.
150. Id at 716.
151. Id
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Tabor replied affirmatively.15 2 This was impossible because the signatory was dead
when the document was signed.153 Tabor was convicted for violating § 1001.154
On appeal, Tabor argued that her false statement regarding the notarization of
the decedent's signature was an "exculpatory no."' 55 The court agreed 5 6 after
considering the facts. 57 Important to the court was the fact that the IRS agent did
not inforn Tabor of the serious consequences that would attend her statement, even
though the agent knew that Tabor could not have properly notarized the decedent's
signature. 58 Moreover, the agent initiated the contact after affirmatively seeking out
Tabor.159 An additional fact the court considered was the extensiveness of the lie
told by Tabor.' 6 Central to the court's analysis was the fact that Tabor's false
responses amounted to no more than a disclaimer of "involvement in possible
criminal activity.' 6' In light of these factors, the court reversed Tabor's § 1001
convictions. 62
Tabor's focus on the elaborateness of the defendant's lie was a primary
characteristic of the narrow approach to the "exculpatory no" analysis. Such a
characteristic distinguished the narrow approach analytically from the factors and
elements approaches. Under the factors approach, the elaborateness of the
defendant's falsehoods would be relevant, but not determinative, to the
"exculpatory no" analysis. 63 Under the elements approach, the elaborateness of the
defendant's falsehoods could be relevant as to whether he or she actually subverted
governmental functions, but it would not necessarily destroy a defendant's ability
to raise the "exculpatory no" defense.'6
III. BROGAN V. UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court never expressly subscribed to the





156. Id at 719.





162. Id. at 719.
163. Supra Part II.B.1.
164. Supra Part ll.B.2.
165. See Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469,473 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Timothy I. Nicholson, Note, Just
Say No: An Analysis of the Exculpatory No Doctrine, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 232-49 (1991)).
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determined whether the "exculpatory no" defense was valid.es Nevertheless,
Brogan ultimately held that the "exculpatory no" defense is invalid. 67
A. The Facts
Petitioner James Brogan and Reinaldo Roman were officers of Local 32E,
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO.)' The union represented
employees of JRD Management Corporation (JRD), a real estate company.
169
In March of 1993, federal agents visited Roman's home. 70 After identifying
themselves as federal agents and informing Roman that he was the subject of a
federal grand jury investigation concerning labor law violations, Roman agreed to
answer questions and invited the agents inside his home.' 7' Roman denied that he
had taken payments from JRD. 72 His responses were simple denials-"nothing" or
"none." 173 Apparently, Roman knew that lying to federal agents was a crime, yet he
declined to modify his answers.' 74 He was convicted of violating § 1001.175
In October of 1993, federal agents visited Brogan's home. 76 The agents
identified themselves and informed Brogan that they sought his cooperation in an
investigation of JRD and other individuals. 77 The agents suggested that Brogan
have his attorney contact the U.S. Attorney's Office if he wished to cooperate.
178
Alternatively, they informed him that an attorney could be appointed for him if he
could not afford one.
79
Brogan then agreed to answer the federal agents' questions.' 80 They asked him
if "he had received any cash or gifts from JRD when he was a union officer."''
Brogan said no.18 At that point the agents toid Brogan that an investigation of JRD
headquarters had led to the discovery of records that indicated Brogan had received
cash or gifts from JRD while he was a union officer.83 The agents also told Brogan
166. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996), aid sub noma. Brogan v. United States,
522 U.S. 398 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court had not conferred validity on the defense).
167. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998).
168. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 35-36.
169. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 399.













183. Id. at 400.
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"that lying to federal agents in the course of an investigation was a crime."'184
Brogan, like Roman, did not change his answers. 85 The interview terminated after
this exchange.1
8 6
Brogan was indicted for making false statements in violation of § 1001.187
Subsequently, ajury found him guilty. 8 8 Brogan appealed, 189 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction. 9
B. The Court of Appeals
In the court of appeals, Brogan again argued that his statements fell within the
"exculpatory no" defense.' 9' The court agreed, without explanation, that Brogan's
statements met the definition of an "exculpatory no."'192 However, it declined to
recognize the "exculpatory no" defense,' 93 because it found no support for the
doctrine in the statute's plain language, its legislative history, or in the Fifth
Amendment. 94 In rejecting the defense, the court addressed the soundness of the
reasoning cited by other courts that had adopted it195 and added two cautionary
points, discussed infra,196 with respect to prosecutions under § 1001.1
97
1. Court of Appeals' Reasoning
a. Plain Language
The court found no support for the defense within § 1001's plain language,
198
and rejected the idea that an "exculpatory no" was not a "statement" within the
meaning of the statute.'99 The court reasoned that uttering the word "no" in response
to a question is a "statement" because, by that utterance, the speaker "intends to




187. See id. (describing the indictment against Brogan).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The opinion of the appellate court appears in United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996)
aff'd sub nom. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
191. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 36-37.
192. Id. at 37.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 38-40 (rejecting the various rationales advanced in support of the "exculpatory no" defense).
195. Id. at 38-40. Wiener's analysis of these reasons will be examined below. Infra Part ll.B.1.
196. Infra Part II.B.2.
197. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 40 (adding two cautionary points to the appellate court's opinion).
198. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 38.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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statute's plain meaning, and concluded that nothing in the wording of the statute
lends itself readily to the "exculpatory no" defense.2°'
b. Legislative History
Furthermore, the appellate court disagreed with the rationale that § 1001's
legislative history supported the "exculpatory no" defense. °2 Amendments to §
1001's predecessor statutes, the court determined, did not show a "congressional
intent to move to progressively narrower liability."203 Rather, the court decided that
§ 1001's textual evolution demonstrated a trend of expansion" inconsistent with
any "exculpatory no" defense that would serve to limit § 1001's scope.
20 5
c. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment rationale was equally unpersuasive to the court of
appeals. 206 Although the privilege against self-incrimination is one of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantees, 2 7 the court held that the "exculpatory no" defense was
more akin to a privilege to lie.208 According to the court, the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination does not include lying.2°9 Because the court
found no support for the "exculpatory no" defense in § 1001's plain wording,
legislative history, orin the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination,
the court affirmed Brogan's and Roman's convictions.210




204. See iL (recognizing the broadening of§ 1001's language).
205. In a similar vein, the court summarily rejected the idea that § 1001's legislative history contains support
for narrowing § 1001 liability to statements or representations that actually pervert governmental functions. See
idL (refusing to limit § 1001 according to unclear legislative history). The court remarked that narrowing the
statute's purview in this fashion would be inconsistent with § 1001's expansive trend, and would amount to a
judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative. See iL (declaring that shaping the statute's purview is entirely
Congress' prerogative).
206. L at 39; see also supra Part II.A (containing a discussion of the connection between the Fifth
Amendment and the "exculpatory no" defense).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (reserving for individuals a privilege against self-incrimination).
208. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39 (implying that the "exculpatory no" defense would give someone a right to
lie).
209. Id The court relied on United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313 (6th Cir. 1991), in support of this
position. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39. Steele noted that no court had held that § 1001 itself violated the Fifth
Amendment. Steele, 933 F.2d at 1320. In addition, Steele decided that "[a]n individual has a constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, but he has no constitutional right to give an untruthful statement." Id.
Therefore, the Fifth Amendment does not justify the "exculpatory no" defense. Id.
210. Wiener, 96 F3d at 40.
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However, the court added two cautionary guidelines for applying § 1001 in
light of its rejection of the "exculpatory no" defense. 21  Whether the court, by
adding these two guidelines, was merely clarifying the scope of its holding, or
opening the door to other possible § 1001 defenses was unclear. Perhaps it included
the cautionary points discussion because of a latent recognition of, and discomfort
with, the breadth of § 1001.
2. The Cautionary Points
The first cautionary point made by the court concerned the willfulness element
of § 1001.212 In Ratzlafv. United States,21 3 the United States Supreme Court held
that a person does not act "willfully" within the meaning of 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322
unless she knows her act is unlawful at the time she acts. 214 In United States v.
Wiener,215 the Second Circuit reasoned that, at least arguably, this holding could
apply to § 1001.16 If so, a prosecutor would have to show "knowledge of
unlawfulness" to prove the willfulness element of § 1001.217 Assuming that
knowledge were an element of § 1001, the court explicitly stated that the "mere
denial of criminal responsibility" would be insufficient to prove that element.218
The second cautionary point made by the court concerned the lack of formality
that can surround violations of § 1001. The court explained that a "denial of guilt
in circumstances indicating surprise or other lack of reflection" might not prove the
requisite mens rea2 19 under § 1001.220 This lack of formality concept, however, did
211. See Ed. (adding cautionary points to its rejection of the "exculpatory no" defense).
212. See hI. (taking note of the willfulness requirement of § 1001 then in effect); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §
1001(a) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring willfulness).
213. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
214. 1&. at 137.
215. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 35.
216. See id. at 40 (recognizing that the Court's reasoning in Ratzlafcould apply by analogy to § 1001).
217. See id. (suggesting that knowledge could be a § 1001 element).
218. Id.
219. Mens rea is a vague term. See JOSHUA DRESSLER,UNDERSTANDING CRIMINALLAW § 10.02[A], at 102
(2nd ed. 1995) (noting that the concept of mens rea is ambiguous). It has two general meanings. Id. The first
meaning is broad and "suggests a general notion of moral blameworthiness." Id. § 10.02[B], at 102. The second
meaning is narrower and can be defined as the mental state required by a statute defining a criminal offense. Id.
§ 10.02[C], at 103.
The court in Wiener was referring to the second meaning of mens rea: the mental state prescribed by the
statute that defines the offense. § 1001 prescribes two mental states: "knowingly and willfully." 18 U.S.C.A. §
1001(a) (West Supp. 1999). Knowledge can be either "actual," or in the form of a "correct belief' in an "attendant
circumstance." DRESSLER, supra § 10.04[B], at 109. Thus, if a suspect either knows a statement is false or
correctly believes it is false, he has met the knowing mens rea element of § 1001.
Villfulness has several meanings. See DRESSLER, supra § 10.04[C], at 111 (discussing the meaning of
"[wlilfully"). It normally is synonymous with intent. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902,
910 (Mass. 1944)). However, it also can mean "'an act done with a bad purpose' or with 'an evil motive."' Id
(quoting Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (bad purpose), and United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,395 (1933) (evil motive)). Thus, ifa suspect makes a false statement intentionally or with
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not apply to Brogan and Roman because the circumstances suggested deliberation
on their part in light of the fact that the agents had informed them of the criminality
of lying under the circumstances. 221 Ultimately, these two cautionary points should
serve to restrict § 1001's reach. Part V of this Casenote addresses these points in
more detail.22
C. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorarim to decide "whether there
is an exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 for a false statement
that consists of the mere denial of wrongdoing, the so-called 'exculpatory no."'22 4
1. Brogan's Arguments
Brogan advanced several arguments to persuade the Supreme Court to adopt the
"exculpatory no" defense.22 First, Brogan argued that § 1001 only criminalized
false statements that perverted or undermined the functions of government.2 6
Second, Brogan argued that the Fifth Amendment conferred validity on the
"exculpatory no" defense.227 Finally, Brogan made the policy argument that the
"exculpatory no" defense was necessary to limit the potential for prosecutorial
abuse.2- These arguments were consistent with the rationales relied upon by the
lower courts in adopting the "exculpatory no" defense.229
a. Perversion of Governmental Functions
According to Brogan, § 1001 only applied to false statements that actually
perverted the functions of government.2" Simply making a false denial of guilt
would not pervert governmental functions.2" Therefore, a mere false denial of guilt
an "evil motive" or "with a bad purpose," such as to thwart an investigation, he has probably met the willful mens
rea element of § 1001.
220. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 40 (explaining that intent in § 1001 cases is difficult to establish).
221. Id.
222. Infra Part V.A.
223. Brogan v. United States, 520 U.S. 1263 (1997).
224. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 399 (1998).
225. See id. at 401-06 (analyzing Brogan's arguments in favor of the "exculpatory no" defense).
226. See id. at 401-04 (responding to Brogan's perversion-of-governmental-functions argument).
227. See id. at 404, 405 (addressing the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the "exculpatory
no" defense).
228. See id at 405-06 (discussing Brogan's contention that without the "exculpatory no" defense,
prosecutors could rely on § 1001 as a tool of abuse).
229. See supra Part II.B (developing the rationales underlying the "exculpatory no" defense).
230. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401-04.
231. Id. at 401.
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would not be punishable as a § 1001 violation because it would not pervert
governmental functions. 2
Brogan based this argument on a statement that the Supreme Court had made
in United States v. Gilliland.233 In Gilliland, the defendant contended that a
predecessor statute to § 1001 applied only to matters in which the government had
a "financial or proprietary interest"--e.g., claims relating to government funds.
The Gilliland Court rejected that argument, stating that Congress intended § 1001's
predecessor statute to "protect the authorized functions of governmental
departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from" making
false statements to them.235 Brogan based his "perversion argument" on this
statement by the Supreme Court, and he interpreted that statement, coupled with his
"perversion argument," to limit § 1001's scope accordingly. 2
6
b. Fifth Amendment
Brogan next claimed that a mechanical application of § 1001's text would
violate the "spirit" of the Fifth Amendment. 7 This argument rested on the notion
that confronting a suspect with a choice of "admitting guilt, remaining silent, or
falsely denying guilt' " would be repugnant to the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination.239 Moreover, Brogan contended that the right
of silence was "an 'illusory' option because a suspect may fear that his silence will
be used against him later, or may not even know that silence is an available
option.,,2' Thus, if the option of remaining silent were illusory, the only true option
for a suspect being questioned would be to deny guilt falsely, because the only other
option-admitting guilt-would be absurd.24' Thus, without an "exculpatory no"
defense, § 1001 would entangle suspects in a web of self-incrimination, and Brogan
claimed that this web violated the spirit of the Fifth Amendment.242
232. Id. at401-02.
233. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
234. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402-03 (unearthing the source of Brogan's perversion argument) (quoting
Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 91).
235. Id. at 403 (quoting Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93).
236. See id. at 402-04 (addressing Brogan's attempt to extrapolate from Gilliland a limit on § 1001).
237. Id. at 404.
238. Id
239. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (preventing the government from compelling an individual to incriminate
herself).
240. Brogan. 522 U.S. at 405 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 16. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998)
(No. 96-1579)).
241. See id. at 404-05 (explaining the contours of one of the former bases of support for the doctrine).
242. See id at 404 (contending that the "exculpatory no" defense is consistent with and protective of the
Fifth Amendment).
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c. Prosecutorial Abuse
Brogan's final argument was based on the potential for prosecutorial abuse of
§ 1001 because of the statute's broad language.243 This argument derived from the
reality that § 1001's language contains few significant limits.244 Advocates of the
"exculpatory no" defense widely endorsed this argument.245
2. The Supreme Court's Analysis
a. Perversion of Governmental Functions
The Court found no support for Brogan's argument that the "exculpatory no"
defense was a manifestation of the following syllogism: § 1001 does not apply to
statements that do not pervert governmental functions; mere false denials of guilt
are statements that do not pervert governmental functions; therefore, § 1001 does
not apply to mere false denials of guilt.246 Despite Brogan's contention, the
Supreme Court held that § 1001 is not limited to statements that pervert
governmental functions.247 As noted, Brogan had based this contention on United
States v. Gilliland.248 However, the Supreme Court concluded that Brogan had
misinterpreted the analysis in Gilliland for two reasons.249
First, the Brogan Court noted that Gilliland rejected the defendant's arguments
to limit the scope of § 1001's predecessor2 0 Because Gilliland had refused to limit
the scope of § 1001's predecessor, the Court reasoned that Brogan's reliance on
Gilliland to support his attempt to limit § 1001's scope was unpersuasive.25
Specifically, the defendant in Gilliland argued that the interpretative canon ejusdem
generis limited the scope of § 1001's predecessor to claims involving government
funds.252 "Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a
specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin
243. See i at 404 (making the prosecutorial-abuse argument).
244. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1999) (limiting the application of § 1001 to willful and knowing
violations). The statute also contains other limits that did not apply in Brogan. For instance, it does not apply to
statements made to ajudge or magistrate by a party to ajudicial proceeding. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(b) (West Supp.
1999). Other limits also exist which apply to matters "within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch." 18
U.S.C.A. § 1001(c)(1)-(2).
245. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 405 (noting that "many supporters of the 'exculpatory no"' defense decry §
1001's breadth in light of its potential for abuse); see also United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir
1990) (stating that the breadth of the statute opens it to abuse); and United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183
(4th Cir. 1988) (same).
246. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401-02.
247. See hi. at 403 (discussing § 1001's textual limitations).
248. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
249. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 403 (rejecting Brogan's interpretation of Gilliland).
250. See id. (noting that Gilliland refused to narrowly interpret the statute).
251. Md.
252. See Gililand, 312 U.S. at 91-93 (analyzing the defendant's arguments).
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to the one with specific enumeration." 53 The defendant's ejusdem generis argument
was based on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Cohn.' The Court
in Cohn held that the words "cheating and swindling" in the false statements statute,
in conjunction with the word "defrauding," "should be construed 'as relating to the
fraudulent causing of pecuniary or property loss' to the Government." 5
An amendment to the statute was the basis of the Court's rejection of the
defendant's argument in Gilliland. *26 The relevant amendment in Gilliland removed
the words "cheating and swindling" from § 1001's predecessor. 57 Accordingly, the
Court in Gilliland refused to limit the statute based on ejusdem generis because the
"cheating and swindling" language, which was no longer part of the statute, was the
basis for the holding in Cohn.258 Therefore, the defendant failed to persuade the
Court to limit the scope of § 1001's predecessor2 9
The second reason the Court believed Brogan's reliance on Gilliland was
misplaced was that Brogan had construed Gilliland to support his argument to
restrict the application of the text of § 1001 to its supposed purpose-to prevent
perversion of governmental functions.2'6 The argument to restrict the text of the
predecessor of § 1001 to its supposed purpose had failed in Gilliland.261 Therefore,
Brogan's reliance on Gilliland to restrict § 1001 to the supposed purpose of
preventing actual perversion of governmental functions did not persuade the Court
in Brogan.262
In addition to rejecting Brogan's major premise, the Brogan Court rejected his
contention that "simple denials of guilt to government investigators do not pervert
governmental functions." 63 According to the majority in Brogan, the purpose of an
investigation of wrongdoing by the government is to discover the truth.26 4 Lying to
investigators about matters under investigation tends to impede the purpose of the
investigation.26 An investigation, moreover, is generally a governmental
function. 66 Therefore, lying to investigators perverts governmental functions.267
253. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991).
254. 270 U.S. 339 (1926).
255. Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 92 (quoting United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1926)).
256. See id, at 93 (noting that the amendment destroyed the force of the holding in Cohn).
257. kid
258. See id, (rejecting the defendant's attempt to limit the statute via principles of construction).
259. Id. at 93-95.
260. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) (rebuffing Brogan's attempted reliance on
Gilliland).
261. Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 92.
262. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402 (finding "no basis for the major premise that only those falsehoods that
pervert governmental functions are covered by § 1001").
263. lId
264. See id. (stating the purpose of a governmental investigation).
265. See id. (reasoning that, by lying, the actor perverts the discovery of the truth, to which an investigation
would lead).
266. See id. (recognizing an investigation as a "proper governmental function").
267. See id. (continuing its analysis of the minor premise of Brogan's syllogism).
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Because falsely denying guilt is a lie, falsely denying guilt perverts governmental
functions.268
Moreover, the argument that false denials of guilt do not pervert governmental
functions because investigators should expect such denials also failed to persuade
the Court.269 While Justice Scalia recognized that this argument was more plausible
than the outright assertion that falsely denying guilt does not, in the abstract, pervert
governmental functions, he declined to analyze the perversive potential of false
denials of guilt from the subjective viewpoint of the investigator.270 He grounded
his decision to reject this analytical approach on the absence of any similar defense
to "the analogous crime of perjury." 27' Because the Court agreed with neither the
contention that § 1001 does not apply to false denials of guilt nor the contention that
false denials of guilt do not pervert governmental functions, it declined to adopt the
"exculpatory no" defense on the basis of Brogan's first argument.
272
b. Fifth Amendment
Brogan's Fifth Amendment argument also failed to persuade the majority for
two reasons.273 First, and most importantly, the Court recognized the right to remain
silent as the manifestation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. 274 According to the Brogan Court, the right to remain silent does
not include a right to lie.275
Second, Brogan argued that a person being questioned faces a cruel array of
potentially self-incriminating options: "admit guilt, falsely deny guilt, or remain
silent., 276 Further, he argued that the right to remain silent was illusory, either
because a person being questioned would fear that her silence would be used
against her, or because a person would be unaware of her right to remain silent.
2 77
However, the Court disagreed that silence was an illusory option for two reasons.278
268. See id (concluding that Brogan's contention--that falsely denying guilt does not pervert the functions
of government-was faulty).
269. See id (assessing the strength of Brogan's argument assuming that investigators do not rely on the false
denial of guilt by a suspect); see also supra Part ll.A (discussing the lack of formalities surrounding the underlying
facts of many § 1001 prosecutions as one fairness-related basis for the "exculpatory no" defense).
270. See id. (rejecting a subjective approach to determining whether a false denial of guilt in fact perverted
governmental functions).
271. Id
272. See if. at 403-04 (expressing disbelief in Brogan's line of analysis).
273. See id. at 404-05 (holding that no nexus exists between the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination and the "exculpatory no" defense).
274. See id. at 404 (discussing the nature of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination).
275. See id (finding no privilege to lie in either the text or the spirit of the Fifth Amendment).
276. Id
277. See id at 405 (addressing Brogan's second argument in support of the "exculpatory no" doctrine).
278. See id (explaining why silence was not an illusory option).
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First, it acknowledged that silence can be used against a suspect. 9 Thus, pressure
is placed on a suspect not to remain silent; however, this pressure, according to the
Court, would not "exonerate an otherwise unlawful lie., 280 Second, the Court found
it "implausible" that a suspect would be unaware of the right to remain silent,
because dramatizations of "Miranda" warnings are common in modem society.28
c. Prosecutorial Abuse
Finally, the prosecutorial abuse argument did not persuade the Court to embrace
the "exculpatory no" defense for three reasons.282 First, the Court decided that the
potential for prosecutorial abuse inherent in § 1001's broad language was an issue
for Congress alone to address. 3 Second, the Court pointed out that Petitioner made
no showing of actual use of § 1001 as a tool for prosecutorial abuse.2 4 Third,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found it unlikely that the "exculpatory no"
defense actually served as an impediment to prosecutorial abuse of § 1001, because
any interrogator could pressure a suspect into telling lies that exceeded the ambit
of the "exculpatory no" defense.285
3. Summary of the Supreme Court's Analysis
To summarize, the Court rejected each of Brogan's arguments in support of the
"exculpatory no" defense.286 First, Brogan did not persuade the Court that § 1001
only punishes statements that actually pervert government functions, or that simple
false denials of guilt do not actually pervert government functions.28 7 Brogan did
not persuade the Court on this score primarily because a false denial of guilt is itself
potentially misleading.288 Second, Brogan failed to persuade the majority that the
Fifth Amendment supported the "exculpatory no" defense, because the Fifth
279. See id. (pointing out that silence, in certain circumstances, can be used against a person either
substantively or to attack credibility).
280. Id. (citing United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1969)).
281. See id. (assuming that people are generally aware of the right to remain silent). Here the Court
essentially took judicial notice of the fact that "Miranda" warnings are often dramatized, and extrapolated the fact
that people are aware of their right to remain silent. Id.
282. See id. at 405-06 (dismissing the "exculpatory no" defense as an insignificant obstacle to prosecutorial
abuse).
283. See id. at 405 (declining to second-guess congressional judgments as to the propriety and expediency
of § 1001's language).
284. See id. (expressing doubt that § 1001 represents the threat to individual liberty that some proponents
of the "exculpatory no" defense argue that it does).
285. See id. at 405-06 (highlighting the tenuousness between the "exculpatory no" defense and potential
instances of prosecutorial abuse).
286. Supra Part I.C.
287. Supra Part lI.C.2.a.
288. Supra Part 1l.C.2.a.
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Amendment confers a right to remain silent-not a privilege to lie.2"9 Finally, the
argument that the "exculpatory no" defense was necessary to curb potential
prosecutorial abuse of § 1001 failed to persuade the majority, because qualifying
the language of the statute was Congress' prerogative-not the courts. 290
4. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg authored a concurring opinion,291 in which Justice Souter
joined.292 In that opinion, both Justices agreed with the Court that the language of
§ 1001 included false denials of guilt within its ambit of punishable conduct; 293
however, they each felt it necessary to express more concern than the majority
about the extreme breadth of § 1001.294 Before addressing the significance of the
cautionary points295 made by the court of appeals, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
frontally addressed some of the potential problems associated with § 1001's
breadth.296
Foremost, Justice Ginsburg was concerned that § 1001's language transformed
it into a tool to be used in the creation of crimes rather than to punish criminal
conduct.297 Section 1001 does not require formality as a precondition to
punishment; for example, the suspect does not need to be in custody, under oath,
or informed of her right to remain silent.298 Absence of these formalities prevents
the suspect pausing "to concentrate.., on the importance of his or her answers. 299
In addition, § 1001's language creates the possibility of undermining an applicable
statute of limitations, because a prosecutor can attempt to elicit a false denial of
guilt in connection with underlying criminal conduct that the law has deemed no
289. Supra Part Il.C.2.b.
290. Supra Part DII.C.2.c.
291. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,408 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
292. Id. Justice Souter also authored a brief concurring opinion in which he expressed disagreement only
with the majority's treatment of § 1001's abuse- potential. d (Souter, J., concurring). On that point, Justice Souter
joined in the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
293. IL (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
294. See id (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining the basis for their choice to concur only in thejudgment);
see also id (Souter, J., concurring) (same). Justice Souter joified in the opinion of the Court except as to its
analysis of the potential for prosecutorial abuse. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg concurred separately
"to call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to
manufacture crimes." Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
295. Supra Part lII.B.2.
296. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408-18 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opining that the bases of support for the
"exculpatory no" defense reflect wariness about § 1001's breadth, and urging Congress to reconsider the statute's
structure).
297. See id. at 408, 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (recognizing § 1001's potential for abuse).
298. See id at 410-11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of the lack of requisite
formalities in the context of a § 1001 prosecution).
299. Id. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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longer punishable.300 Lack of formalities, along with the prospect of punishing a
denial of wrongdoing when the law has made the wrongdoing itself non-punishable,
according to Justice Ginsburg, make § 1001 a potential tool for the manufacture of
crimes by government agents. °1 Manufacturing crimes is contrary to the duty of
law enforcement, which is to prevent crime and punish criminals. 302
The next problem with § 1001's language, according to Justice Ginsburg, is that
it does not conform to its intended scope. 33 After reviewing the history of § 1001, 304
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the conclusion of a lower federal court that Congress
enacted it to combat "affirmative, aggressive, and voluntary, 30 5 endeavors by
people to pervert the functions of government. 3° Punishment of an "exculpatory
no" would be outside the scope of this purpose, because an "exculpatory no" would
be more passive than an affirmative denial, especially in a case such as Brogan's,
where the government initiated the questioning.30 7
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg included a brief analysis of the two
cautionary points 08 made by the court of appeals.3°9 Justice Ginsburg suggested that
the issue of whether a suspect must have knowledge that making a false statement
to a federal investigator is unlawful remains open, because both the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court did not address the issue.310 She further suggested that
neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court would agree that a false denial
of wrongdoing alone would satisfy the knowledge element.3 1' Lastly, she opined
that the lack of formalities forming the basis of many § 1001 prosecutions could
300. See id. at 411-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (pointing out that § 1001 conflicts with the spirit of statutes
of limitation).
301. See id. at 408, 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that the combination of these factors lends
strength to the idea that § 1001 is too broad).
302. See id. at 414 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,372 (1958))
(opining as to the proper role of law enforcement).
303. See i at 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress did not intend to create such a broad
statute).
304. See supra Part II (discussing the history of § 1001).
305. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 413 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Paternmostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298,
302 (5th Cir. 1962)).
306. See id. 413-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (concluding that the intended scope of § 1001 is narrower
than its language).
307. Justice Ginsburg noted that the government "has not been blind to this concern." Id. at 414 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring). For instance, the policy of the Department of Justice has been to refrain from pursuing
prosecutions for an "exculpatory no.' See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (recognizing the significance of the
Department of Justice's reluctance to punish an "exculpatory no" as evidence that § 1001's language exceeds its
purpose).
308. See supra Part III.B.2 (reviewing these points).
309. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 416 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (mentioning the questions left open by the
Second Circuit in the opinion below).
310. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting that the issue of knowledge remains unresolved).
311. See 1d. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opining that a denial of guilt would not satisfy the knowledge
requirement). Here Justice Ginsburg wrote as if the Court had tacitly decided this issue, rather than having left
it unresolved. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (extrapolating the significance of what the majority omitted from
its analysis).
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render it more difficult for the government to prove the criminal intent element.312
However, notwithstanding these potential limitations on abuse of § 1001, as well
as reluctance on the part of the Department of Justice to prosecute an "exculpatory
no," Justice Ginsburg asserted that § 1001 remains too broad.313
5. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens generally agreed with Justice
Ginsburg's assessment of § 1001's language problems; however, he disagreed as
to the rejection of the "exculpatory no.' 314 The basis of his dissent was twofold: (1)
a literal reading of § 1001 could lead to absurd results inconsistent with the statute's
purpose; and (2) widespread judicial recognition of the "exculpatory no" reflected
a sound analysis of § 1001.315 In support of the former, Justice Stevens pointed out
that a literal reading of § 1001 would make it a felony for an undercover federal
narcotics agent to lie to a drug dealer.316 However, because this result would be
absurd, Justice Stevens contended that the Court hardly would acquiesce to such a
rigid interpretation.3 7 As to the second basis of his dissent, Justice Stevens was
unwilling to dismiss perfunctorily the significance of the fact that many lower
federal courts had recognized the "exculpatory no" defense. 3 8 To Justice Stevens,
312. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (pointing out that while the absence offormalities required by § 1001
lends it to abuse, the same absence of formalities could make it more difficult for the government, in theory, to
prove the statute's willfulness element).
313. iaL (Ginsburg, L, concurring). "The controls now in place, however, do not meet the basic issue, i.e.,
the sweeping generality of § 1001's language." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
314. See i&d at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. See id. at418-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that absurd literal interpretations have led courts
to interpret statutes creatively, and that near- consensus recognition of the "exculpatory no" defense had conferred
legitimacy on its existence).
316. See id. at419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that formalistic interpretations of statutory language
can produce untoward results).
Indeed, a federal narcotics agent who lied to a drug dealer would be guilty of violating § 1001 under a literal
reading of the language. The following hypothetical illustrates this point X is an undercover federal narcotics
agent. He has spent months infiltrating a ring of heroin dealers by posing as a heroin dealer himself. Y is one of
the heroin dealers in the group that X has infiltrated. Y has always been suspicious that X is an undercover federal
narcotics agent. Y asks X, "Are you a federal agent?" X replies, "Hell no. I'm a dealer, same as you," X has
violated the literal text of § 1001 because he has lied about his status as a federal narcotics agent. X's status as
an agent is a matter "within the jurisdiction of the executive.., branch of the Government of the United States,"
18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West Supp. 1999), because federal narcotics agents' status as such is determined by the
executive branch. X has knowingly and willfully made a false statement in this matter because he knew he was
an agent. This statement was material because the status of federal narcotics agents is important to the executive
branch. Notwithstanding that X has committed a felony under the literal text of § 1001, a government prosecution
of X would be absurd.
317. See id. at420 (Stevens, ., dissenting) (admonishing against adoption of an unnecessarily literal reading
of the statute's language).
318. See i. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating the second basis for his dissent).
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this reflected the whole substance of § 1001, and he criticized the majority for
failing to give respectful deference to such a widespread interpretation." 9
Of course, these arguments did not persuade Justice Scalia. First, Justice Scalia
adhered to his preference for a purely textual interpretation of the law by noting that
§ 1001's text admits of no "exculpatory no" defense.320 Second, he would not agree
that near-consensus on the issue by the lower courts should dictate the law.32'
Whether the Court's conclusions were sound is another issue.
IV. CRITIQuE OF BROGAN
A. The Soundness of the Decision
The Supreme Court's decision to reject the "exculpatory no" defense was
technically sound. Given the arguments that Brogan advanced in support of the
"exculpatory no" defense, the Court's ultimate rejection of the doctrine was
difficult to refute. Nevertheless, while the analysis the Court used in ultimately
rejecting each of Brogan's arguments was acceptable, it was less than flawless. This
sub-part critically addresses the Court's analysis of the three main arguments
Brogan advanced in support of the "exculpatory no" defense: (1) the perversion-of-
governmental-functions argument;32 (2) the Fifth Amendment argument; 323 and (3)
the prosecutorial-abuse argument.324 This sub-part critically addresses the Court's
analysis of three of the main arguments Brogan advanced, and also addresses the
conspicuous absence from the majority opinion of any discussion of § 1001's
legislative history.
325
1. Perversion of Governmental Functions
Brogan's perversion-of-governmental-functions argument was strong on one
count and weak on another. Recall the premises of Brogan's syllogism that he
advanced in support of this argument: mere false denials of guilt do not pervert
governmental functions; § 1001 only proscribes falsehoods that pervert
319. See id. at 420-21 (Stevens, L, dissenting) (asserting that the majority had shown disrespect for the lower
federal courts by dismissing their understanding of § 1001 without at least thoroughly addressing the quality of
their understanding or the reasons behind it).
320. See id. at 408 (relying on the text of the statute to analyze the propriety of the "exculpatory no"
defense).
321. See id. at 408 (dismissing the significance of the lower federal courts' opinions).
322. See infra Part IV.A.1 (inspecting this argument).
323. See infra Part IV.A.2 (considering this argument).
324. See infra Part IV.A.3 (focusing on this argument).
325. See infra Part IV.A.4 (addressing the absence of an analysis of the legislative history).
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governmental functions; § 1001 does not proscribe mere false denials of guilt. 26
Were it not for its unpersuasive-and somewhat disingenuous-rejection of the
first premise, the analysis behind the Court's rejection of Brogan's perversion-of-
governmental-functions argument would have been much stronger. Conversely, but
for his inability to establish the second premise, Brogan's argument would have.
been more persuasive. Although the Court rejected both premises,327 it was
Brogan's inability to establish the second premise-because of the statute's
text-that proved fatal to his perversion-of-governmental-functions-argument.
a. The Tenability of Brogan's Minor Premise
The minor premise of Brogan's syllogism advanced in support of the
perversion-of-governmental-functions argument-that mere false denials of guilt
do not necessarily mislead investigators-was tenable. 328 For instance, in Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence, she noted that in United States v. Tabor,329 the defendant
was prosecuted for a lie that did not mislead anybody because the questioner
already knew the answers to the questions that were asked.330 Indeed, Brogan's false
denials misled nobody because the investigators who questioned him already
possessed records that indicated his denials of wrongdoing were false.
Nonetheless, the majority stated that it "[could not] imagine how it could be
true that falsely denying guilt in a Government investigation does not pervert a
governmental function. 332 This proposition may be true as an abstract matter,
assuming credulous investigators; however, the proposition is not always true,
because the law never operates in the abstract. For instance, the majority
overlooked the fact that neither Brogan's nor Tabor's false denials of guilt misled
the federal agents who questioned them.333 The majority's unwillingness to accept
even the possibility that a mere false denial of guilt could not mislead an
investigator suggests that it had already decided to invalidate the "exculpatory no"
defense. Along these lines, much of the Court's reasoning smacks of result-
orientation and detracts from the readiness with which one might embrace the
Court's ultimate conclusions. While the proposition that the text of the statute bears
326. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401-02 (dissecting the reasoning behind Petitioner's perversion.of-
governmental-functions argument).
327. Il at 402.
328. See id at 401-02 (recapitulating Brogan's argument for limitation of § 1001's scope).
329. 788 F.2d 714 (1lth Cir. 1986). In that case, an IRS agent had discovered a violation of state law by
a notary public, who then lied about the violation to the agent. Id. at 718. Because the agent already had known
about Tabor's violation, the false denial thereof did not mislead the agent. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
330. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
331. See id (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (mentioning the fact that the investigators already knew the answers
to their questions).
332. Id. at 402.
333. See id at 410 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (pointing out that Tabor's mendacity did not mislead anyone).
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no "exculpatory no" defense is true, it does not follow that a false denial of guilt
must mislead an investigator. Had this basis been the only ground for rejecting
Brogan's syllogism, the Court's opinion could be classifiable as intellectually
dishonest, result-oriented, or both.
b. The Strength of Brogan's Major Premise
The major premise of Brogan's syllogism-that § 1001 only proscribes
falsehoods that actually pervert governmental functions-was flawed. Here the
majority redeemed itself by relying on the statute's text to refute the premise that
§ 1001 only applies to falsehoods that actually pervert governmental functions."
In-depth discussion here is unnecessary; § 1001 simply contains no limiting
language of the kind.335 The conclusion that § 1001 proscribes even those
falsehoods that do not actually pervert governmental functions was both sound and
unsurprising.
The Court did not need to go any further than the statute's text to be sound in
rejecting Brogan's perversion-of-governmental-functions contention. Indeed, the
Court should have focused solely on the text of § 1001 to defeat the second premise
of Brogan's governmental functions syllogism. Ultimately, the Court was correct
that § 1001 is not limited to falsehoods that actually pervert governmental
functions. It follows, a fortiori, that the Court was correct in rejecting the
"exculpatory no" defense on the basis of Brogan's perversion-of governmental-
functions argument. Still, the reasoning above suggests that the Court was
determined, if not eager, to arrive at that conclusion.
2. Fifth Amendment
The Court did a better job of repudiating Brogan's argument that either the
Fifth Amendment or its "spirit" somehow compels the adoption of an "exculpatory
no" defense. 36 Justice Scalia predictably relied on the text of the amendment in
concluding that the "exculpatory no" defense finds no basis of support there.
337
Justice Scalia was also unpersuaded that the "spirit" of the Fifth Amendment
justifies the "exculpatory no" defense, primarily because the history of
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination suggested a contrary result.338 That privilege has been consistently
334. See id. at 408 (holding that the statute's language dictated a result contrary to Brogan's contentions).
335. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (proscribing "any materially false ... statement")
(emphasis added).
336. See supra Part UI.C.2.b (discussing the Court's rejection of Brogan's Fifth Amendment assertions).
337. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 404 (cementing the Court's conclusion in the Fifth Amendment's text).
338. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980) (limiting the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination).
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interpreted as manifesting itself in the right to remain silent.339 Brogan's attempt to
extend that privilege to a right to lie in the name of the "spirit" of the Fifth
Amendment was inconsistent with these past interpretations.
Although not mentioned in Brogan, Harris v. New York' ° further strains
Brogan's "spirit-of-the-Fifth-Amendment" argument. In Harris, the Supreme Court
held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona34'-which dealt
with the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination342-- could be admitted against a defendant for purposes of impeaching
that defendant on cross-examination at tria?"43 The Court reasoned that to forbid the
use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching a
witness's credibility would in effect license the defendant to commit perjury.
344
After Harris, a defendant who takes the stand and makes statements
inconsistent with those obtained in violation of her "Miranda" rights forfeits the
right to suppress those statements for impeachment purposes. 345 Ergo, the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination ends where the lies
begin.346 Based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, and in light of Harris, the Court
did a better job of repudiating Brogan's argument that the Fifth Amendment
necessitates adoption of the "exculpatory no" defense.
3. Prosecutorial Abuse
Again, the Court reached the correct result in rejecting as a basis for the
"exculpatory no" defense the argument that, without such a defense, § 1001 would
be a tool for prosecutorial abuse. The soundness of the Court's conclusion rests on
its awareness of the doctrine of separation of powers and related notions of judicial
restraint. However, as with the Court's rejection of Brogan's perversion-of-
governmental-functions argument, the Court again employed disingenuous
339. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 404 ("[P]roper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but not to swear falsely."' (quoting Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. at 117)).
340. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
341. 384 U.S. 436(1966).
342. See id. at 439 (outlining the parameters of self-incrimination). The Court addressed the "necessity for
procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege... not to be compelled to incriminate
himself." Id.
343. See Harris,401 U.S. at 226 (validating the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda for purposes
of impeaching credibility at trial).
344. See id at 225 (reasoning that preclusion of the use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for
impeachment purposes would be to construe the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination as
including a "right to commit perjury").
345. Id at 226.
346. See id at 225 (refusing to allow a defendant to lie under the ostensible safeguards of the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination).
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reasoning by refusing to acknowledge that § 1001 could be a tool of prosecutorial
abuse.
a. Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint
Notions of separation of powers and related notions of judicial restraint were
forceful factors against adopting the "exculpatory no" defense. Assuming,
arguendo, that § 1001 would be a tool of prosecutorial abuse without the
"exculpatory no" defense, the Court's amelioration of the problem via adoption of
the defense would have been analytically inconsistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers and similar principles calling for judicial restraint. 3 7 Assume
further that the Court agreed with Brogan that § 1001 would be a tool for
prosecutorial abuse unless the Court were to recognize the "exculpatory no"
defense. Assume, finally, that the Court therefore refused to apply the letter of the
statute by reversing convictions under § 1001 based on mere false denials of
wrongdoing. An argument could be made that, by this hypothetical conduct, the
Court would be effecting a policy agenda by ignoring a clear legislative mandate.
If so, such conduct would do violence to Article I, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States ... ." By blatantly ignoring the text of
the statute, the Court would subject itself to attack for, essentially, amending the
statute, an exercise of legislative power granted exclusively to Congress, not to the
courts.3 4 9
Justice Scalia was aware of the importance of judicial restraint. He noted that
a problem with the breadth of the statute was an issue for Congress, not for the
courts. 350 This reasoning was consistent with Article I of the United States
Constitution, and represented a sound use of judicial restraint.
b. Evidence of Actual Abuse
In rejecting the "exculpatory no" defense as a necessary blockade against
prosecutorial abuse, Justice Scalia also included in his analysis the fact that Brogan
had adduced no concrete evidence of abuse of § 1001.35 Unfortunately, Justice
Scalia missed the point by cursorily dismissing the possibility that § 1001's breadth
347. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (vesting the legislative power in the Congress).
348. 1dL
349. Id.
350. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. at 405 (1998) (deflecting the blame for discontent with the
statute to Congress, the body responsible for its enactment).
351. See id. (attempting to buttress the majority's conclusion that prosecutorial abuse of § 1001 should not
justify the "exculpatory no").
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could render it a tool for prosecutorial abuse.352 Reasonable minds could conclude
that a case like Tabor represents at least one instance of prosecutorial abuse of §
1001.
353
Even assuming that a case like Tabor is not hard evidence of actual abuse of §
1001, Justice Scalia's non-analysis of the potential for abuse inherent in § 1001's
'language proves troublesome. Nevertheless, abuse is apparently in the eye of the
beholder. Justice Scalia was the beholder in Brogan, and there was no abuse in his
eye.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's refusal to probe the potential for abuse
inherent in § 1001's broad text, the Court correctly rejected the "exculpatory no"
defense on the basis of the prosecutorial-abuse argument. However, the strength of
this conclusion does not derive from the lack of actual evidence of abuse of § 1001;
rather, it derives from Article I of the United States Constitution.2
4. Section 1001's Legislative History
The Brogan Court should have addressed § 1001's legislative history before
rejecting the "exculpatory no" defense. The statute's history suggests by
implication that Congress did not intend to abrogate the "exculpatory no"
defense.355 In addition, the history contains language that supports Brogan's Fifth
Amendment and prosecutorial abuse arguments.
a. Recent Legislative History and the "Exculpatory No" Defense
At a general level, the most recent legislative history of § 1001 supports the
existence of an "exculpatory no" defense for at least two reasons. One reason is that
the recent history expressly gives deference to the courts applying § 1001, despite
the fact that Congress likely was aware of the existence of the "exculpatory no"
defense;356 the House Judiciary Committee stated that § 1001 in its most recently
amended form was not meant to change "already existing case law as it relates to
the elements" of the offenses outlined in § 1001(a).317 This strongly suggests that
352. See id. at 405-06 (dismissing the idea of § 1001's potential for abuse in one paragraph).
353. See id. at 410 (Ginsburg, L, concurring) (describing United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (1 1th Cir.
1986), as an instance of use of § 1001 to prosecute someone for a non-misleading falsehood).
354. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (reposing the legislative power in Congress).
355. See Petitioner's Brief at20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (advancing
the argument that several decades of congressional inaction as to the "exculpatory no" defense in the face of
numerous amendments to § 1001 supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend § 1001 to apply to simple
false denials of guilt); see also infra Part IV.A.4.a-c (making a similar argument).
356. See Petitioner's Brief at 20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579)
(articulating the argument that congressional silence amounts to approval of the "exculpatory no" defense).
357. H.R REP. No. 104-680, at4 (1996), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3935, 3942.
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Congress approved of the case law development of the application of § 1001,
including the "exculpatory no" defense. 58
Another, and related, reason that the most recent legislative history supports the
"exculpatory no" defense is that the history fails to mention it.359 Congress probably
was aware of the defense in 1996.'60 If Congress wished to abrogate the defense, it
at least could have included statements indicating disapproval of the defense in the
legislative history.3 6' At most, congressional failure to mention the defense in the
legislative history suggests tacit approval.362 This congressional silence regarding
the "exculpatory no" defense suggests that, even in the absence of any express




The most recent legislative history implicitly supports Brogan's Fifth
Amendment argument. Although the history makes no mention of a clash between
§ 1001 and the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
it does express awareness of the fact that certain applications of § 1001 could create
an "intimidating atmosphere, . . perhaps . . . discouraging the exercise of
Constitutional rights.",364 This statement is consistent with, and lends support to, the
point that the "exculpatory no" defense alleviated pressures on suspects to forbear
asserting their constitutional right to remain silent.36
358. See Petitioner's Briefat20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398(1998) (No. 96-1579) (advancing
a similar argument).
359. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 104-680, at 4 (1996), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3935, 3942.
360. See supra Part H.A (discussing the widespread adoption of the defense in the lower federal courts prior
to Brogan); see also Petitioner's Brief at 20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579)
(explaining that Congress likely was aware of the defense when it made several amendments to § 1001).
361. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 211 (1974) (describing the interpretive canon as follows: "mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of another, expresio unius est exclusio alterius"); see also Petitioner's Brief at 20-
25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (pointing out the years of congressional silence
regarding § 1001 and the "exculpatory no" defense); cf Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S.
1, 22 (1898) (applying the "expresio unius" maxim).
362. See Petitioner's Brief at 20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (making
a similar argument); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 211 (1974) (discussing the interpretive canon "expresio
unius" est exclusio alterius).
363. See Petitioner's Brief at 20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (reasoning
that Congress' failure to act affirmatively to destroy the "exculpatory no" defense indicated congressional
approval of the defense).
364. See H.R. REP. No. 104-680, at 4-5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3935,3937-39 (discussing
the reasons underlying § 1001(c)(1) and 1001(c)(2)). Although this discussion was related to the reasons that
Congress decided to exempt certain statements made to the legislative branch, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(c) (West
Supp. 1999) (exempting these statements), it demonstrates that Congress was aware of the power of § 1001 in
relation to the assertion of constitutional rights.
365. See supra Part ll.A (explaining the Fifth Amendment rationale that formed one basis of the
"exculpatory no" defense).
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c. Prosecutorial Abuse
Section 1001's most recent legislative history also contains language which
suggests that Congress was aware of the potential for abuse inherent in the
section.36 In response to arguments that § 1001 should apply to all communications
to Congress, and that prosecutors should be trusted to limit responsibly the use of
§ 1001, the House Judiciary Committee voiced its unwillingness to put such trust
in prosecutors,3 67 stating: "[a] criminal statute should not be broadly formulated and
then defended by asserting that prosecutors will not apply it in selected
circumstances. Certainty about the scope of a criminal statute must not be based on
the hope of future prosecutorial restraint.3 68
In light of the tacit support in favor of the "exculpatory no" defense in the
legislative history, the Court's failure to address it, even cursorily, is a mystery.
Evidently, the majority was satisfied that the text of § 1001 was bereft of ambiguity,
and that resort to the legislative history was therefore unwarranted. 369 However, §
1001 is not necessarily bereft of ambiguity. The extremely broad language of the
statute itself suggests that the scope of its application is at least somewhat
ambiguous. 3 0 Did Congress truly intend the statute to apply to "any" and every
materially false statement? Intuition and common meanings of the word "any"
counsel caution before embracing such an astronomically broad interpretation of
§ 1001. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language37 and
Webster's American College Dictionary372 each include "every" as the fourth of
several definitions of "any."373 The first and second definitions, respectively, of
"any" in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language are: (1) "one
(no matter which) of more than two"; and (2) "some., 374 Thus, whether § 1001
criminalizes "every" materially false statement, "some" materially false statements,
or "one... of more than two" materially false statements, is less than clear. The
word "any" itself is ambiguous in the context of this criminal statute. Indeed,
Justice Stevens pointed out that a literal reading of the statute makes "it a crime for
366. See H.R. REP. No. 104-680, at 5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3935, 3939 (realizing that
prosecutors cannot always be trusted to be reasonable in restraining themselves in applying § 1001). This
discussion also centered around the reasons underlying § 1001(c) . Id. at 4-5, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3935,3937-3939. However, the idea that prosecutors could abuse § 1001 is not limited to § 1001(c).
367. See id (expressing misgivings about "prosecutorial restraint").
368. d
369. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (confining most of its reasoning to the "plain
language" of § 1001).
370. See id at 419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that a rigidly literal reading of § 1001 could lead
to anomalous results).
371. WEBSTER's NEwWORLD DICTIONARYOFTHEAMERICANLANGUAGE 27(1977).
372. WEBSTER'S AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 36 (1998).
373. L; WEBSTER'S NEW WoRLD DICTIONARY OFTHE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 27.
374. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 27.
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an undercover narcotics agent to make a false statement to a drug peddler. ,37
However, the majority noted that § 1001 would not apply in such a situation,
probably because Congress would not have intended such a result.376 This dispute
over the meaning of the text of the statute between the majority and Justice Stevens
demonstrates that § 1001's text is capable of being interpreted ambiguously, and
therefore suggests that the legislative history was relevant to an analysis of whether
the statute would bear the "exculpatory no" defense.
A simplified, perspective analysis of Brogan reveals a glaring weakness in the
Court's reasoning. As noted above, the Court's conclusion hinges almost entirely
on the premise that no ambiguity exists in § 1001's text.377 On its face, the text
probably does not support the "exculpatory no" defense;378 however, as
demonstrated above, that text can be interpreted ambiguously, because defining the
word "any" to mean "every" renders the statute inordinately broad.379 Such
ambiguity should have triggered an analysis by the Court of the statute's legislative
history,380 which seems to lend tacit support to the "exculpatory no" defense.
38
1
Thus, by attacking the key premise upon which the Court's reasoning rests-that
§ 1001 is unambiguous-the strength of the Court's conclusion diminishes. When
coupled with the fact that nearly all of the courts of appeals that had addressed the
issue had interpreted the "exculpatory no" defense as being compatible with §
1001,382 the Brogan Court's failure to address the legislative history detracts from
the strength of its conclusion, even if that conclusion was correct.
375. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority quickly concluded that this was not a
result that Congress intended. See iL at 406 (noting that "reasonable actions" of law enforcement officers are
generally exempt from "criminal prohibitions"). Apparently, congressional intent is less relevant when applying
a statute against an individual.
376. See id. (agreeing that § 1001 and other "[c]riminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable
enforcement actions by officers of the law").
377. See id. at 408 (concluding that § 1001 did not support the existence of the "exculpatory no" defense
because the statute's plain language "admits of no exception for an 'exculpatory no").
378. Section 1001(a) purports to apply to "any" materially false statement. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West
Supp. 1999).
379. To the extent "any" is deemed coterminous with "every," § 1001 virtually is unlimited in scope. See
Petitioner's Brief at 18-20, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (discussing the potential
for abuse of§ 1001 "in the hands of an over-zealous prosecutor" that exists if§ 1001 is interpreted literally).
380. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-48 (1940) (discussing the
interpretation of statutes and the role of a statute's legislative history in such an interpretation); see also 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes § 194 (1974) (explaining that ambiguous statutory language may call for a review of relevant
legislative history).
381. See Petitioner's Brief at 20-25, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (founding
one argument in support of the "exculpatory no" defense in the history of § 1001's enactment and subsequent
reenactments).
382. See supra Part II (listing the jurisdictions that had embraced the "exculpatory no" defense).
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B. The Effect of the Death of the "Exculpatory No" Defense on the Breadth of
§ lOOl
The death of the "exculpatory no" defense will have little effect on the breadth
of § 1001.13 There is a simple explanation for this. An adroit investigator easily
could pressure an individual into telling lies that exceed the protections of the
"exculpatory no" defense, especially once an individual has initially falsely denied
guilt.384 Moreover, the situation in which someone accused of wrongdoing denies
that wrongdoing is not at all uncommon.385 Justice Scalia agreed with this idea,386
and partly based his rejection of Brogan's prosecutorial-abuse argument in support
of the "exculpatory no" defense on this idea.3 7 Within the extreme breadth of the
text of § 1001, the "exculpatory no" defense was like the proverbial needle in a
haystack. That is not to say the defense was unimportant. If the defense prevented
even some abuse, it was salutary. The point is not that the "exculpatory no" defense
was worthless; rather, the point is that § 1001's breadth will not grow much in the
defense's absence. Although the defense's smallness, relative to the breadth of the
statute, does not bear on the defense's validity, it is relevant to the point that §
1001's breadth is of such enormous girth that the "exculpatory no" defense was not
capable of taking to task § 1001's full potential for abuse.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. Transform the Court of Appeals' Cautionary Points into the Law
Courts should build on the Wiener court's two cautionary points388 and
transform them into law. The Wiener court's first point was that a person arguably
must have knowledge that making a false statement is unlawful in order to meet the
willfulness requirement of § 1001.389 The second point was that the informality of
circumstances attending many § 1001 violations might reflect an absence of the
383. See Nicholson, supra note 165, at 256 (pointing out that while the "exculpatory no" defense
theoretically protected individuals from unfair § 1001 prosecutions, in reality, only a tiny number of individuals
had successfully invoked the defense).
384. See id at 253 (noting that a "'no' can grow under intense questioning. Investigators might be tempted
to force the subject of their inquiry to expand upon an initial negative response").
385. See id. at 225 (recognizing the connection between lies and official investigations).
386. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1998) (explaining why the "exculpatory no"
defense did not afford much protection to the average individual confronted by a government investigation).
387. See id. (pondering how the "exculpatory no" defense actually would curb prosecutorial abuse). Justice
Scalia noted that an investigator would have no problem pressing "the liar from the initial simple denial to a more
detailed fabrication that would not qualify for the exemption." Id.
388. See supra Part liM.B.2 (exploring the two cautionary points).
389. United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1996); see also supra Part I.B.2 (containing a
discussion of the Wiener cautionary points).
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requisite criminal intent.3" In keeping with sound policy, these points should direct
trial courts to address each of these points in any § 1001 analysis.
1. The Knowledge-of-Unlawfulness Cautionary Point
Knowledge of unlawfulness should be a necessary component of § 1001's
willfulness element3 9' for two related reasons. First, such a requirement would
achieve consistency with the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the
willfulness element of 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322.392 Second, a knowledge-of-unlawfulness
component would achieve structural consistency between § 1001 and 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 5322.
a. Ratzlaf v. United States and Knowledge of Unlawfulness
In Ratzlaf v. United States,393 the Court held that willfulness in 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 5322(a), which makes willful violations of certain financial institution reporting
requirements a felony,39 means that a defendant must "act with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful. 395 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court was influenced
by 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324(a), which prohibits a person from purposely "evading"
certain financial institution reporting requirements.
Section 1001, like § 5322, should include a knowledge-of-unlawfulness
element, because courts should interpret the willfulness element of statutes within
the same code in a consistent manner.397 Congress presumably intended the word
"willful" to have one meaning throughout the United States Code.398 Indeed, if
Congress intended to compel a different interpretation of the state-of-mind
requirement of § 5322 from § 1001, the use of the same word--"willfulness"---to
describe that state-of-mind requirement was a clumsy way of expressing such an
intention. Thus, for purposes of interpretative consistency, the Ratzlafinterpretation
of "willfulness" should govern § 1001.
390. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 40.
391. See Scott D. Pomfret, A Tempered 'Yes' to the 'Exculpatory No', 96 MICH. L. REV. 754, 776 (1997)
(asserting that, in "cases of moral ambiguity, fair notice requires actual knowledge that the conduct is wrong").
392. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a) (West Supp. 1999).
393. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
394. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a) (West Supp. 1999).
395. Ratzlaf, 5 10 U.S. at 137. Importantly, the Court interpreted § 5322's "willfulness" requirement in light
of § 5324, which proscribes acting "for the purpose of evading" the reporting requirements of other related code
sections. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324(a) (West Supp. 1999). In light of § 5324's emphasis on purpose, the Court read a
knowledge-of-unlawfulness requirement into § 5322's "willfulness" element. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137-38.
396. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324(a) (West Supp. 1999).
397. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143 (noting that a "term appearing in several places in a statutory text is
generally read the same way each time it appears").
398. See iL (iterating the importance of interpretative consistency in applying statutes).
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b. Structural Consistency Between § 1001 and 31 U.S. C.A. § 5322
In addition to the goal of achieving interpretative consistency, the adoption of
the Ratzlaf "willfulness" definition makes sense based on the structures of § 5322
and § 1001, respectively. Section 5322 only requires that a person act "willfully"
in violating the statute in order to meet the state-of-mind requirement. 39 However,
despite the lack of a knowledge requirement in § 5322, the Ratzlaf Court implied
a knowledge requirement.4 True, the implicit knowledge requirement created in
Ratzlaf was based on a contextual reading of § 5322 in light of the § 5324
proscription against purposefully evading certain financial institution reporting
requirements,0 1 and § 1001 is not modified by § 5324.4 However, § 1001, while
not modified by § 5324, requires that a person act "willfully" and "knowingly.
' 4 3
Section 1001's express inclusion of a knowledge requirement obviates the need for
reading that requirement into the statute by implication. Moreover, the inclusion of
a knowledge requirement refutes any counter argument that the Ratzlaf
interpretation of willfulness should be limited to § 5322, because the express
inclusion of a knowledge requirement in § 1001 compensates for the absence of a
statute similar to § 5324 in Title 18. The inclusion in § 1001 of a knowledge
component in addition to the willfulness component suggests that the Ratzlaf
definition should apply to § 1001.
Moreover, apart from the effect of harmonizing the interpretation of the
"willfulness" requirements of § 5322 and § 1001, the Ratzlaf interpretation of
.'willfulness" is attractive because it would be tantamount to a requirement that
federal agents make persons whom they question aware that lying to them would
be unlawful. Otherwise, proving that a suspect had subjective knowledge of § 1001
and its proscriptions would be extremely difficult. This interpretation would remove
much of the controversy over the potential for abuse of § 1001, because requiring
an investigator to expressly inform an individual of the proscriptions of the statute
would limit an investigator's ability to utilize the statute insidiously. However, it
is unlikely that the Court would transpose the Ratzlafinterpretation of "willfulness"
onto § 1001, because it could eviscerate the statute's otherwise gargantuan sphere
of applicability.
399. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that, to subject one's self to penalties, a person
must "wllfully" violate the applicable sub-chapter of Title 31 (emphasis added)).
400. Raizlaf, 510 U.S. at 138.
401. See id. at 146-47 (noting that § 5322 only criminalized persons who willfully violated § 5324,
signifying a congressional "intent to require for conviction proof that the defendant knew not only of the bank's
duty to report .... but also of his duty not to avoid triggering such a report").
402. See 31 U.S.C.A. 5324(a) (West Supp. 1999) (making purposeful evasions ofeertain financial institution
reporting requirements a felony).
403. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring willfulness and knowledge to show a violation
of the statute).
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2. The Criminal Intent and Informal Circumstances Cautionary Point
In the context of lying to a federal agent in violation of § 1001, basic common
sense dictates that an inverse relationship exists between criminal intent and
informality of circumstances.' As the informality of the circumstances which
surround a lie that violates the literal text of § 1001 increases, the likelihood that the
person who lied harbored the requisite criminal intent decreases. 4°5 The fact that §
1001 only criminalizes "knowing" and "willful" violations strengthens this notion.
The combination of these words as components of the § 1001 state-of-mind
requirement indicates that Congress intended to punish only falsehoods that are
reflective of significant, meaningful deliberations.' Several factors could indicate
a lack of significant deliberation on the part of the individual: (1) whether the
investigative interview took place at the individual's home;- 7 (2) whether the
individual was advised by counsel; 4 8 (3) whether the individual was informed of
his rights;4 9 (4) whether the individual was informed that lying to federal
investigators is unlawful;4 '0 and (5) the state of mind of the investigator.41' Of
404. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410-11 (Ginsburg, L, concurring) (expressing concern over the informality
of the circumstances that can attend § 1001 violations).
405. See United States v. Wiener, 93 .3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging the "possibility that a trier
of fact might acquit on the ground that a denial of guilt in circumstances indicating surprise or other lack of
reflection was not the product of the requisite criminal intent").
406. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 415 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opining that "felony prosecutions for bare
exculpatory denials informally made to Government agents" are at least of "dubious propriety"); see also Pomfret,
supra note 388, at 778 (taking the position that "[mI]ore elaborate statements rather [than simple false denials of
guilt] ... suggest premeditated, nefarious and 'willful' motives").
407. See id. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of the setting where questioning
occurs).
408. Justice Ginsburg stated that Brogan would have benefitted from having counsel present when he was
questioned by federal agents. Id. at 409-10 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "Had counsel appeared on the spot, Brogan
likely would have received and followed advice to amend his answer I to say immediately: 'Strike that; I plead
not guilty."' Id.
409. Cf. id. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (mentioning that suspects often are not informed of the
penalties that attach to violating § 1001 until after they have answered questions).
410. Cf. id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the fact that suspects are not aware of the
seriousness of lying to federal investigators); Pomfret, supra note 388, at 776-77 (arguing the importance of
"actual knowledge that the conduct is wrong" before penalizing someone for uttering an "exculpatory no"); see
Nicholson, supra note 165, at 253 (urging that investigators be required to inform suspects that failing to answer
questions truthfully could subject them to prosecution); see also supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the possibility of
a knowledge of unlawfulness component to the § 1001 state of mind requirement).
411. For instance, whether the investigator already knew the answers to the questions being asked, as in
United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (1 th Cir. 1986), is probative of whether the investigator employed insidious
use of § 1001, and whether the individual lied reflexively or engaged in a more thoughtful attempt to deceive. See
Pomfret, supra note 388, at 778 (stating that elaborate false denials of guilt reflect a higher degree of culpability
than simple false denials). In Brogan, Justice Ginsburg noted that the agents who questioned Brogan "gave no
advance warning... because they wanted to retain the element of surprise." Brogan, 522 U.S. at 409 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring). This passage suggests that investigators gain an advantage by surprising unwary suspects. The
more surprising the encounter is to the individual, the less likely the individual will engage in meaningfully
deliberate attempts to deceive the investigators.
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course, this list is not exhaustive, but courts should either instruct juries that the list
is not exhaustive, or be more cognizant of the possibility of granting a defendant a
directed verdict where an application of the above factors compels the conclusion
that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea.
B. Reduce the Grade of§ 1001 Violations to the Misdemeanor Level
Lastly, Congress should reduce the grade of § 1001 violations to the
misdemeanor level for a series of interrelated reasons rooted in fairness, logic, and
proportionality.412 As to fairness, the drafters of the American Law Institute's (ALI)
Model Penal Code created section 241.3 in response to § 1001.!13 The ALI decided
to grade violations of section 241.3 as misdemeanors in order "to reflect the
conclusion that the penalties of [s]ection 1001 are too high. 4 t4 In reaching this
conclusion, the drafters of the Model Penal Code noted that § 1001 was, at least in
1962, unparalleled in the criminal laws of any state.41 5 The ALI correctly
determined that conduct similar to that violative of § 1001 should be considered
only a misdemeanor.
Related notions of fairness suggest that § 1001 violations should be graded as
misdemeanors. For instance, Justice Ginsburg poignantly noted that an informality
of circumstances commonly attends a § 1001 violation. 6 Section 1001 contains no
oath requirement to impress upon the individual the importance of being truthful.
417
The questioning frequently takes place in an informal setting, such as a suspect's
home, as opposed to a custodial setting where the suspect would likely be more
412. See, e.g., MODELPENALCODE § 241.3 (1962) (classifying conduct similar to that proscribed by § 1001
as a misdemeanor). This section provides:
(1) In General. A person commits a misdemeanor if, with purpose to mislead a public servant in performing
his official function, he:
(a) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true; or
(b) purposely creates a false impression in a written application for any pecuniary or other benefit, by
omitting information necessary to prevent statements therein from being misleading; or
(c) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be forged, altered or otherwise lacking
in authenticity; or
(d) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, boundary-mark, or other object which
he knows to be false.
(2) Statements "Under Penalty." A person commits a petty misdemeanor if he makes a written false
statement which he does not believe to be true, on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law,
to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable.
(3) Perjury Provisions Applicable. Subsections (3) to (6) of Section 241.1 apply to the present section.
Id
413. See id at § 241.3 cmt. 1 (acknowledging that section 241.3 was "suggested" by § 1001).
414. Id
415. See id. (pointing out that "[n]o state law of equal breadth was discovered during the drafting process").
416. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 389,410-11 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing the
variety of informal components of many § 1001 violations).
417. See id at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reiterating the importance of the oath).
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cognizant of the seriousness of being truthful.418 In addition, absurd is the notion
that prosecutors theoretically could rely on § 1001 to punish the denial of conduct
that has itself become non-punishable because the relevant statute of limitations has
run.4 9 Finally, the federal perjury statute provides for sanctions equal in severity
to those available under § 1001, but it applies only to statements made after the
actor either took an oath, or declared the assertions "under penalty of perjury.
420
The oath is not a hollow formality. Rather, it serves to impress upon the individual
being questioned a heightened awareness of the need to be truthful.42' In the absence
of an oath requirement, it would seem viscerally unfair, not to mention illogical and
disproportionate, to deem violators § 1001 to be equally culpable to violators of §
1621. Thus, grading a § 1001 violation as a misdemeanor would be more consistent
with the interrelated notions of fairness, logic, and proportionality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The soundness of the result in Brogan v. United States4  depends largely on
how one perceives § 1001's language. To the extent that one agrees with Justice
Scalia that § 1001 is phrased unambiguously, the ultimate rejection of the
"exculpatory no" defense was sound.423 Conversely, to the extent that one finds
ambiguity in the statute, the decision to reject the "exculpatory no" defense was
assailable in light of the statute's legislative history424 and general recognition of the
"exculpatory no" defense in the lower federal courts.4 However, even if one agrees
that § 1001 is unambiguous, the reasoning in Brogan is suspect for at least two
418. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (pointing out the relevance of the site of the questioning in relation
to the individual's awareness of the importance of being truthful).
419. See id. at 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referring to such a possibility as the "generation [by the
government] of a crime when the underlying suspected wrongdoing is or has become nonpunishable").
420. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (West 1984). Like § 1001, § 1621 also provides for punishment by incarceration
for up to five years in prison. Id.
421. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (declaring that the oath concentrates the
"speaker's mind on the importance of his or her answers").
422. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
423. See id. at 408 (basing the conclusion on the statute's text); see also supra Part IV.A.4.c (arguing that
the soundness of Brogan depends on whether one perceives vagueness in § 1001).
424. See H.R. REP. No. 104-680 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3935 (containing some of the
recent legislative history of § 1001); see also supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing the statute's legislative history in
relation to the "exculpatory no" defense).
425. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 420 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mentioning the importance of the fact that
many federal judges had embraced the "exculpatory no" defense); see also supra Part ll.A (explaining the
prevalence of the defense's viability in the lower federal courts prior to Brogan).
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reasons. First and foremost, it fails to address the statute's legislative history.426
Second, a general flavor of result-orientation pervades the opinion.427
Sound or unsound, the "exculpatory no" defense is dead.428 True, it probably
was of little theoretical assistance in blocking the potential for abuse of § 1001 by
overzealous prosecutors.429 In fact, it was probably as much of a safeguard as
wearing a seatbelt in an airplane crash.430 In the wake of its extinction, courts,
attorneys, and the public in general are left to contend with a non-violent felony
statute that is unfortunately insidious, unnecessarily broad, and disproportionately
harsh. These statutory shortcomings need to be corrected; § 1001 needs to be
limited. Obviously, the best way to correct any language problems with the statute
would be for Congress to amend it. However, other avenues of limitation may be
used, such as the cautionary points outlined by the court in United States v.
Wiener.4 3 In addition, Congress would be wise to adopt the eminently sensible
approach of the Model Penal Code by reducing the grade of § 1001 violations from
felonies to misdemeanors.432 In the meantime, § 1001 will lurk in the repertoire of
the "over-zealous prosecutor."'
433
426. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408 (failing to address the legislative history); see also supra Part IV.A.4
(addressing the statute's legislative history).
427. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402 (expressing an inability to imagine how a false denial of guilt could not
mislead an investigator, notwithstanding the fact that Brogan's false denial itself probably misled no one); see also
supra Part IV.A.l.a (highlighting examples of result-orientation in the Court's opinion).
428. See id. at 408 (affirming the Wiener Court's rejection of the "exculpatory no" defense).
429. See id. at 405-06 (explaining that overzealous investigators and prosecutors could skirt the defense with
ease).
430. Cf. id. (stating that the "exculpatory no" defense was of little assistance in limiting the reach of§ 1001).
431. 96 F.3d 35,40 (2d Cir. 1996).
432. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.3 (1962).
433. See Petitioner's Brief at 18, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579) (warning of
the dangers inherent in § 1001 if not limited by the "exculpatory no" defense).
